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Over the course of the last year, policymakers have begun to ask whether antitrust can 
play a constructive role in the network neutrality debate.  A review of both the theory 
and the practice of antitrust suggests that it does have something to contribute.  As an 
initial matter, antitrust underscores that standardization and interoperability are not 
always beneficial and provides a framework for determining the optimal level of 
standardization.  In addition, the economic literature and legal doctrine on vertical 
exclusion reveal how mandating network neutrality could reduce static efficiency and 
could impair dynamic efficiency by deterring investment in alternative last-mile 
technologies.  Antitrust thus suggests that network neutrality is better suited to the ex 
post, case-by-case approach associated with the rule of reason than the ex ante, 
categorical approach associated with per se illegality and regulation.  To say that the 
substantive principles of antitrust offer insights that can inform the debate is not to say 
that antitrust courts represent the optimal institutional locus for enforcing a network 
neutrality mandate.  Lingering questions about courts’ institutional competence to 
supervise access regimes suggest that to the extent that antitrust enforcement 
authorities wish to take a more active role with respect to network neutrality, they 
would be better served by focusing their efforts on disclosure and consumer education 
than attempting to use antitrust to impose access requirements on network owners. 
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Introduction 
 Over the past two years, an issue known as “network neutrality” has emerged as one of the most 
hotly contested issues in communications policy.  Proposed amendments that would have mandated 
network neutrality played a pivotal role in the debates over telecommunications reform legislation pending 
before Congress.1  Network neutrality has also been a recurrent concern in recent regulatory proceedings 
before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  For example, in issuing its Wireline Broadband 
Internet Access Services Order in August 2005, the FCC found insufficient evidence to justify mandating 
                                                 
1 On April 5, 2006, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee rejected a network neutrality amendment by a vote of 8-23 before approving the 
bill by a vote of 27-4.  Three weeks later, the full Committee also rejected a network neutrality 
amendment by a vote of 22-34 before approving the bill by a vote of 42-12.  During the debates on the 
bill on the House floor, the full House rejected a network neutrality amendment by a vote of 152-269 and 
approved the underlying bill by a vote of 321-101.  The issue was more closely contested in the Senate, in 
which the Senate Commerce Committee rejected a network neutrality amendment by a vote of 11-11.  
Disagreements over the issue played a key role in preventing the underlying legislation from reaching the 
Senate floor.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1847, 1855-60 (2006). 
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network neutrality as a regulatory matter.2  At the same time, the FCC reserved the right to change its 
mind should circumstances warrant doing so3 and issued a Policy Statement recognizing its intention to 
preserve consumers’ rights to access content, run applications, and attach devices as they see fit.4  The 
FCC’s orders clearing a number of recent mergers reaffirmed its decision not to mandate network 
neutrality, concluding that competition was sufficiently robust to prevent network providers from 
discriminating against any particular content or applications and pointing to the lack of evidence in the 
record that any network provider had engaged in such practices.5  In March 2007, the FCC issued a notice 
of inquiry seeking specific examples of network providers disfavoring particular content and seeking 
comment on the impact of any such behavior on consumers.6 
 
 As the debate has matured, policymakers have begun to consider whether antitrust might play a 
constructive role in the network neutrality debate.  On May 26, 2006, the House Judiciary Committee 
reported a bill that would have incorporated a network neutrality mandate into the antitrust laws.7  The 
                                                 
2 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order 
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14904 ¶ 96 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline 
Broadband Internet Access Services Order], petition for review filed sub nom. Time Warner Telecom v. 
FCC, No. 05-4769 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2005).   
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 
20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005).  The FCC’s commitment to promoting access was subject to caveats for the 
needs of law enforcement, protection against harm to the network, and reasonable network management.  
Id. 
 
5 AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5727-31 ¶¶ 116-120, 5742-46 ¶¶ 151-153 (2007) [hereinafter AT&T-BellSouth 
Order]; Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses:  Adelphia 
Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable 
Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia Communications Corporation (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and 
Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner, Inc.; Transferee; Time Warner, Inc., 
Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 
8296-99 ¶¶ 217-223 (2006) [hereinafter Adelphia Order]; Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. 
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433, 
18507-09 ¶¶ 139-142 (2005) [hereinafter Verizon-MCI Order]; SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp. 
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290, 
18365-68 ¶¶ 140-143 (2005) [hereinafter SBC-AT&T Order].   
 
6 Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Inquiry, 22 F.C.C.R. 7894 (2007).  
 
7 Marilyn Geewax, House Panel OKs “Network Neutrality,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., May, 26, 2006, at G1. 
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Senate Judiciary Committee has engaged in active discussions as to whether network neutrality could be 
addressed through antitrust.8  In a major policy speech, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman 
Deborah Platt Majoras “urge[d] caution” and warned of the dangers of mandating network neutrality 
“absent clear evidence of market failure or consumer harm.”9  At the same time, the FTC formed an 
Internet Access Task Force to study issue, which conducted two days of hearings in February 200710 and 
issued a report recommending that policymakers should hesitate before mandating network neutrality in 
the absence of a clear demonstration of market failure or consumer harm.11 
 
 In this Article, I would like to explore what antitrust can contribute to the debate about network 
neutrality.  Part I explores the implications of the economics of standardization.  Part II examines the 
insights provided by the theory and doctrine on vertical exclusion.  Part III evaluates institutional 
considerations addressing whether antitrust courts or administrative agencies represent the proper 
institutional locus for network neutrality.  I conclude that although the substantive principles embodied in 
federal antitrust law offer insights that can enlighten the current policy discussion, the institutional 
limitations of antitrust enforcement suggest that consumer protection would be better promoted through 
ensuring that consumers have more complete information than through enforcing a network neutrality 
mandate. 
I. The Costs and Benefits of Standardization and Interoperability 
 Network neutrality proponents argue that regulation must protect applications and content 
providers’ ability to reach every possible consumer if the environment for innovation on the Internet is to 
be preserved.12  There is no question that standardization and interoperability provide real consumer 
benefits.  As is the case with any economic attribute, however, these benefits are counterbalanced by 
other considerations.  Thus, the economic literature does not provide unequivocal support for 
                                                 
8 David Hatch, Stevens “Very Close” to Votes Needed for Telecom Cloture, CONGRESS DAILY PM, July 27, 
2006, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/. 
 
9 Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Luncheon Address at the Progress & Freedom 
Foundation’s Aspen Summit:  The Federal Trade Commission in the Online World – Promoting Competition 
and Protecting Consumers 14, 15 (Aug. 21, 2006), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060821pffaspenfinal.pdf. 
 
10 Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy:  Public Workshop Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Feb. 13-
14, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/broadband/index.html. 
 
11 Fed. Trade Comm’n Internet Access Task Force, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy:  A Federal 
Trade Commission Staff Report (June 2007) available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v070000report.pdf. 
 
12 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 
151 (2003). 
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standardization.  Instead, the literature suggests a framework for determining the optimal level of 
standardization and helps identify those factors that will determine when nonstandardization would better 
promote competition and economic welfare. 
 
 The economic analysis of standardization draws in large part on the burgeoning literature on 
network economic effects13 that has begun to play an increasingly important role in antitrust law.14  
Network economic effects exist when the value of a network is determined by the number of other 
customers connected to it.  The more people you can reach through the network, the more valuable it 
becomes.  According to network neutrality proponents, mandating nondiscriminatory access to a 
standardized network would promote innovation by guaranteeing that all innovators will be able to reach 
the widest possible market.15  At the same time, network economic effects are often described as creating 
demand-side scale economies that give larger networks decisive competitive advantages.  Over time, the 
greater value of the larger network inevitably induces customers of smaller networks to shift to larger 
networks, which in turn causes the difference in value created by network economic effects to widen still 
further until only the largest provider survives.  One policy concern is that the resulting feedback effect 
will tend to drive markets toward monopoly.  In addition, once the market adopts a particular standard, 
network economic effects create a form of inertia that can make that standard unusually difficult to 
dislodge.  In other words, once a market has become “tipped,” network economic effects can cause an 
existing network technology to become “locked in” and persist even after a superior technology has 
emerged.16  After a market has become tipped, network neutrality proponents warn, the network owner 
will be in a strategic position to control the direction of innovation by determining which, if any, 
innovations will be permitted to go forward.17   
 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete:  Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 117; Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, 
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network 
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). 
 
14 See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 49-50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. 
Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, 939, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995). 
 
15 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Architecture of 
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 945-46 (2001). 
 
16 See, e.g., Brian W. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility:  
Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941-43 (1986); Michael L. 
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 108.  
 
17 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 39-42, 173-75 (2002). 
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 Focusing solely on network economic effects arguably suggests that standardization and 
interoperability would be the optimal business practice in all network industries.  A closer reading of the 
literature reveals that the analysis is considerably more complex than some network neutrality proponents 
would lead one to believe.18  For example, the leading commentators on network economic effects have 
long recognized that one of the primary costs of standardization is the loss of product variety.19  As a 
simple, formal model offered by Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner illustrates, the optimality of 
standardization depends on whether the benefits from product diversity dominate the benefits from being 
part of a larger network or vice versa.  Indeed, this model identifies circumstances under which the 
equilibrium level of standardization is excessive and where social welfare would increase if the networks 
were permitted to become incompatible.20   
 
 This in turn suggests that the move away from universal standardization may represent nothing 
more than the natural outgrowth of the elimination of the restrictions on commercialization in the mid-
1990s.21  The increasing heterogeneity of the demands being placed on the network has created 
considerable pressure on the network to evolve in response.  Should consumer preferences become 
sufficiently heterogeneous, nonstandardization may represent the optimal outcome.22  Thus, as I have 
argued at length elsewhere, these considerations counsel in favor of adopting an approach of “network 
                                                 
18 The discussion that follows draws on the more extensive analysis presented in Christopher S. Yoo, 
Beyond Network Neutrality, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 34-37 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Beyond Network 
Neutrality].  One insight often overlooked in the more simplistic expositions is that network adoption 
decisions involve not one, but two offsetting network economic effects.  As a result, markets may be too 
willing as well as too reluctant to change standards, depending on which of the two effects dominates.  
Whether technology adoption will exhibit excess momentum or excess friction is thus an empirical 
question that cannot be answered a priori.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media 
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 278-79 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Vertical 
Integration]. 
 
19 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 110 (noting that “the primary cost of standardization is the loss of 
variety:  consumers have fewer differentiated products to pick from, especially if standardization prevents 
the development of promising but unique and incompatible new systems”); Joseph Farrell & Garth 
Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985) (counting 
“reduction in variety” as one of the “important social costs” of standardization). 
 
20 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986). 
 
21 Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?:  A 
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 34-37 (2004). 
 
22 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 106 (noting that “market equilibrium with multiple incompatible 
products reflects the social value of variety”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology 
Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 (1996) (“Where there are 
differences in preference regarding alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely outcome.”). 
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diversity” that allows network owners to experiment with different architectures.23  Permitting networks to 
dif ferentiate the services in this manner can help alleviate the tendency toward market concentration 
associated with any demand-side scale economies created by network economic effects.24  In the words of 
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, “Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to . . . sustain 
multiple networks.  If the rival systems have distinct features sought by certain customers, two or more 
systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more about product attributes than 
network size.”25 
 
 The analysis is complicated still further when the underlying technological environment is 
dynamic.  As Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro noted in their seminal work on network economic effects, 
when the underlying technology is static, private ordering will tend to lead to suboptimal levels of 
standardization.26  They note in a companion piece that the incentives in favor of standardization and 
compatibility can become excessive when the underlying technology is undergoing rapid technological 
change.27 
 
 The costs of standardization and compatibility become particularly concrete once one focuses on 
the particular form of standardization implicit in the leading network neutrality proposals.  In attempting 
to preserve the existing architecture of the Internet, these proposals in essence endorse preventing 
network owners from deviating from the transfer control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP), which 
represents the de facto standard governing the current Internet.  TCP/IP has two salient characteristics.  
First, it routes packets on a “best efforts” basis that does not provide any guarantee that any particular 
packet will ever arrive.  Second, it prioritizes packets on a “first come, first served” basis without regard to 
the source of the content or the particular application with which the packets are associated.   
 
 While well suited for the applications that dominated the early years of the Internet, such as e-
mail and web browsing, for which delays of a fraction of a second are essentially unnoticeable, TCP/IP has 
posed problems for newer applications that either require guaranteed delivery within a certain amount of 
time, such as remote heart monitoring, Internet telephony, streaming media, and graphics-intensive 
online gaming.  As a theoretical matter, network owners have the option of reducing latency by deploying 
                                                 
23 Yoo, supra note 21, at 54-63; Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, Beyond Network 
Neutrality, at 18-65; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and Competition Policy:  A Complex 
Relationship, in NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING:  SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGULATED? 25 
(Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006). 
 
24 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 27-37. 
 
25 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 110. 
 
26 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 13. 
 
27 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress, 38 
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 146 (1986).  
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additional bandwidth rater than engaging in network management.  Such a solution would require network 
owners to anticipate correctly the amount of bandwidth necessary and where it should be located.  As a 
practical matter, network owners are never able to anticipate the precise magnitude and shape of 
consumer preferences, the manner in which end users will distribute themselves geographically, and the 
manner in which the complementary technologies that affect network demand will develop.  When 
combined with the fact that network capacity takes time to deploy, this inherent uncertainty in the pattern 
and magnitude of network demand necessarily means that adding bandwidth will not always be available 
as an option.28 
 
 Indeed, as noted earlier, one of the primary concerns most often expressed is that the universal 
adoption of a particular standard can cause that standard to become “locked in” and that feedback effects 
can stifle deviations from the existing standard even when such deviations would be efficient.29  This 
would suggest that the central policy goal should be to encourage rather than discourage network owners 
to experiment with architectures that deviate from the status quo.  It also suggests that mandating 
standardization might somewhat perversely serve to reinforce rather than alleviate a source of market 
failure. 
 
 The Protean quality of network economic effects only serves to underscore their ambiguity.  
Rather than serving as a one-way ratchet in favor of universal interoperability, as some network neutrality 
proponents suggest, network economic effects are more properly regarded as providing a framework for 
determining the optimal level of standardization.  Furthermore, features of the current Internet, such as 
increasing heterogeneity and technological dynamism, suggest that deviations from universal 
interoperability might in fact be optimal.  At a minimum, the literature suggests that policymakers should 
not adopt a posture of a priori skepticism toward experiments with alternative network architectures that 
deviate from TCP/IP. 
 
 The problem is well illustrated by a problem that arose on the NSFNET during the mid-1980s.  
The NSFNET was originally designed on the assumption that end users would connect to the network 
through dumb terminals.  In so doing, the network managers failed to anticipate the emergence of the 
personal computer, which made it easy for end users to transfer files as well as enter keystrokes.  The 
increase in file transfer sessions eventually congested the network until terminal sessions began to run 
acceptably slow.  Although the best long-run solution was to expand capacity to reflect the increase in 
network demand, such a solution was unavailable in the short run.  NSFNET’s interim solution was to 
impose nonneutrality by reprogramming its routers to give terminal sessions a higher priority than file 
transfer sessions.30 
 
                                                 
28 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 20-26, 70-71. 
 
29 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 
1045-54 (1996) (arguing that Internet standards are subject to lock-in). 
 
30 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 22-23. 
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 This example underscores the extent to which capacity expansion and network management 
represent alternative approaches to the problems of congestion.  Although NSFNET turned to network 
management only as an interim measure, such a solution need not be temporary.  On the contrary, one 
would expect the relative costs of capacity expansion and network management to vary over time and for 
the preferred solution in any particular case to vary with the precise nature of the costs involved.  At some 
point and in some instances, network management would presumably emerge as the more efficient 
solution.31 
 
 This possibility counsels against tying network managers’ hands by limiting their flexibility in 
addressing the needs of network management a priori.  Promoting what I have called “network diversity” 
would allow network owners to pursue a broader range of technological, institutional, and pricing 
arrangements.  Many network neutrality proponents are animated by a particular vision of the ideal 
structure of the Internet built around the so-called “end-to-end argument,” in which innovation is 
concentrated on the edge of the network and can proceed without having to obtain permission from 
network owners.  As I have discussed at some length in my prior work, the original theoretical writings on 
the end-to-end argument upon which network neutrality proponents based their early arguments explicitly 
recognize that deviations from end-to-end are sometimes appropriate and reject arguments that it should 
be universally mandated.32  Simply put, certain types of innovation require close coordination with the 
core of the network.  As technology develops and the demands that end users are placing on the network 
change, it is only natural for the network to evolve to meet these new demands, and some of these 
changes may well take place within the network itself rather than at the edge.  Mandating standardization 
on the current architecture of the Internet threatens to foreclose these types of innovations. 
 
 These considerations suggest that the term, network neutrality, is something of a misnomer.  On 
the contrary, every routing protocol inevitably favors certain applications and disfavors others.33  Thus, by 
favoring content and applications suited to the Internet’s current architecture, network neutrality only 
promotes innovation of a particular type.  The benefits of the greater market reach provided by 
standardization must be offset by the loss of innovations that depend on a fundamentally different 
network architecture to succeed. 
 
 It is for this reason that a growing number of senior network engineers, including TCP/IP co-
author Robert Kahn and the so-called “grandfather of the Internet” David Farber, have recently come out 
in opposition to network neutrality.34  A large group of distinguished economists recently issued a 
                                                 
31 Id. at 22, 71. 
 
32 Yoo, supra note 21, at 41-46. 
 
33 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 20-22, 25. 
 
34 David Farber & Michael Katz, Hold Off on Network Neutrality, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A19; 
Andrew Orlowski, Father of the Internet Warns Against Network Neutrality, THE REGISTER, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/18/kahn_net_neutrality_warning/ (quoting Robert Kahn). 
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statement making largely the same point.35  Other distinguished scholars, such as end-to-end co-author 
David Clark, while sympathetic to the goals of network neutrality, have urged caution to make sure that it 
is not implemented in a way that prevents network owners from providing the quality of service 
guarantees upon which many innovative new services depend.36  Indeed, history suggests that our very 
conception of what constitutes “the network” may be subject to change.  To state just one example, it is 
easy to forget that what we now know as the Internet began as an application riding on top of a voice 
network.  In today’s world, voice is now an application riding on top of a data network.  This fundamental 
inversion of what constitutes “the network” may be destined to repeat itself.  Many people regard content 
distribution networks like Akamai as an application overlaid on top of the Internet.  It is conceivable that 
distributed caching, with intelligence embedded in the network to reroute queries to different caches in a 
manner that minimizes delay and the use of network resources, may again revolutionize our notions of 
what constitutes “the network.”37 
II. The Economics of Vertical Exclusion 
 Network neutrality proponents also raise the concern that network owners will engage in vertical 
exclusion.38  Vertical exclusion occurs when a firm uses its control over a critical input to harm competition 
in upstream and downstream markets that depend upon that input.  A firm can attempt to exercise 
vertical exclusion in two different ways.  First, a firm that controls a bottleneck input can vertically 
integrate into an adjacent level of production and either by deny competitors access to the input 
altogether or set the price for access to that input so high that competitors cannot compete effectively.  
Second, the firm can accomplish the same result without vertically integrating simply by giving 
preferential treatment to a limited group of strategic partners and offering less attractive terms to 
everyone else.  
 
 In the context of network neutrality, the concern is that digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable 
modem providers will use their control over the last mile either to favor their own proprietary content and 
                                                 
35 William J. Baumol et al., Economists’ Statement on Network Neutrality Policy (AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center Working Paper No. RP07-08, Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976889. 
 
36 Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet:  The End-to-End 
Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 70 (2001); David D. Clark, 
Network Neutrality:  Words of Power and 800 Pound Gorillas, 1 INT’L J. COMM. (2007) (forthcoming this 
issue). 
 
37 Dave Clark et al., The Growth of Internet Overlay Networks:  Implications for Architecture, Industry 
Structure and Policy 15-28 (Sept. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 33rd Research 
Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy), available at  
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/466/TPRC_Overlays_9_8_05.pdf. 
 
38 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 17, at 165-66; Barbara van Schewick, Toward an Economic Framework for 
Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 336-78 (2007). 
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applications or to enter into agreements that give selected content and applications providers preferential 
treatment over their competitors.  This is not the first time that policymakers have been concerned that 
last-mile providers might vertically exclude unaffiliated providers of content and applications.  The same 
concern underlay the proceedings initiated by the FCC during the 1970s and 1980s known as the 
Computer Inquiries, which attempted to prevent the Bell System from using its control over its local 
telephone networks to harm competition in the “enhanced services” that were the precursor to modern 
content and applications associated with the Internet.39  The federal government’s antitrust suit that led to 
the breakup of AT&T, while primarily designed to foster competition in long distance, also included 
provisions prohibiting the Bell System from offering proprietary “information services,”40 a category which 
it defined to be coterminous with “enhanced services,”41 and requiring it to provide equal access to all 
information service providers.42  Finally, the FTC and the FCC responded to concerns that Time Warner’s 
cable modem systems would favor America Online’s proprietary content by conditioning their approval of 
the merger between those two companies on their willingness to negotiate access agreements with at 
least three unaffiliated Internet service providers.43   
 
 In each case, the conceptual foundation was the essential facilities doctrine.44  Leading 
commentators have recognized that concerns about discrimination in favor of affiliated services that lie at 
the heart of the essential facilities doctrine is about vertical exclusion.45  The analogy between network 
neutrality and the essential facilities doctrine thus suggests that the debate should be informed by the 
dramatic changes in the stance taken with respect to vertical exclusion in the economic literature and in 
Supreme Court doctrine over the past half century, which has largely abandoned per se illegality in favor 
                                                 
39 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks:  Economic and Constitutional Connections, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 1005-09 (2003). 
 
40 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90 (D.D.C. 1982) (“MFJ”), aff’d mem. sub nom. 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).   
 
41 Id. at 178 n.198. 
 
42 Id. at 195-97. 
 
43 America Online, Inc., Decision and Order, Docket No. C-3989, 2001 WL 410712 (F.T.C. Apr. 17, 2001); 
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time 
Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6590 ¶ 96 (2001).  
 
44 United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (D.D.C. 1981); Gerald R. Faulhaber, 
Bottlenecks and Bandwagons:  Access Policy in the New Telecommunications, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 487, 493-94 (Samit K. Majumdar et al. eds., 2005).   
 
45 3A PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 771a, at 169-71 (2d ed. 2002); Gregory J. 
Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 462 (1987). 
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of the rule of reason, which permits practices to go forward unless and until actual harm to competition 
can be shown.46   Abandoning ex ante prohibition in favor of an ex post, case-by-case approach would 
provide the breathing room for experimentation upon which technological and economic progress depend.  
It would also reflect appropriate humility to anticipate which business models will ultimately prove 
successful. 
A. Vertical Exclusion and Static Efficiency 
 This law and economics of vertical exclusion has undergone a sea change over the past half 
century.  As I trace below, the theoretical literature has become much more skeptical of firms’ ability and 
incentive to engage in vertical exclusion.  In addition, a growing body of empirical scholarship has 
revealed that vertical practices tend to be welfare enhancing.  These analytical developments have 
transformed both Supreme Court doctrine and the enforcement policies of the federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies and provide insights into the network neutrality debate.  This Part closes by 
examining more recent arguments that have attempted to reframe network neutrality in horizontal rather 
than vertical terms. 
1. The Theoretical Literature on Vertical Exclusion 
 Antitrust law has largely tracked the ebb and flow of the theoretical analyses of vertical exclusion 
appearing in the industrial organization literature.  Prior to the 1970s, the scholarly literature was quite 
hostile toward vertical practices, arguing that vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints rarely 
yielded efficiencies and that firms with relatively small market shares could fairly easily foreclose entry in 
their primary markets and could harm competition in vertically related markets.47  
 
 Over time, commentators associated with the Chicago School of antitrust law and economics 
began to chip away at antitrust’s traditional hostility toward vertical practices.  They showed that as a 
threshold matter, certain structural preconditions must be met before vertical integration and vertical 
contractual restraints can plausibly harm competition.  First, the firm must have a dominant position in its 
primary market.  Otherwise, buyers could avoid any attempts to exercise vertical exclusion simply by 
transferring their purchases to another provider.  Second, the secondary market into which the firm is 
attempting to exercise vertical exclusion must also be concentrated and protected by entry barriers.  If 
not, any attempt to raise price in the secondary market would simply cause competitors to expand their 
production and/or stimulate new entry.48 
                                                 
46 For a more extensive review of this history, see Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 18, at 186-206; 
Yoo, supra note 1, at 1885-87. 
 
47 See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 144-47, 155-56 (1956); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. 
TUNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:  AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 120-21, 132 (1959). 
 
48 See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:  Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 
281, 290 (1956). 
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 Even when the market is structured in a way that allows firms to exercise leverage over vertically 
related markets, those firms generally lack the incentive to do so.  Since the 1950s, scholars have 
recognized that there is typically only one monopoly rent in any vertical chain of production and that a 
firm that monopolizes any one level can generally capture all of the available profit without vertically 
integrating simply by charging the monopoly price for its input.49  Firms thus have far less incentive to 
engage in vertical exclusion than previously imagined.  The literature did identify some circumstances 
under which vertical practices can be profitable.  The fact that in most of these cases the vertical exclusion 
was either welfare enhancing (such as when the vertical practice eliminates double marginalization50) or 
ambiguous (such as when the vertical practice facilitates price discrimination51 or rationalizes input 
substitution when inputs can be used in variable proportions52) gainsaid any suggestion that these 
exceptions could justify blanket hostility toward vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints.  
The clearest case when vertical exclusion is both profitable and economically detrimental is when firms 
use vertical integration or vertical contractual restraints to evade rate regulation, which even scholars 
advocating a more accommodating stance toward vertical practices conceded posed a threat to 
competition.53  The emergence of competition among different network providers has led to the 
widespread curtailment of rate regulation, which in turn has rendered this exception increasingly less 
important. 
 
 At the same time, commentators recognized that vertical integration and vertical restraints can 
be the source of substantial efficiencies.  In particular, these scholars have drawn on Coase’s early work 
on the theory of the firm54 to explore how vertical integration can reduce transaction costs.55  Chicago 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 
(1957). 
 
50 See, e.g., Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950).  
 
51 See, e.g., Martin K. Perry, Price Discrimination and Forward Integration, 9 BELL J. ECON. 209, 215 
(1978). 
 
52 See, e.g., John M. Vernon & Daniel A., Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 
79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). 
 
53 Compare, e.g., William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 933, 947 
(1987) (arguing that “all vertical arrangements should generally be presumed benign”); with William F. 
Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concern with Vertical Integration by Regulated Industries—“For 
Whom the Bell Doctrine Tolls”, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 243 (1983) (recognizing that vertical integration by a 
regulated monopolist can lead to anticompetitive harms).   
 
54 R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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School scholars drew upon this theoretical literature to argue in favor a less restrictive stance toward 
vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints.56  Indeed, some commentators went so far as to 
suggest that vertical practices so rarely harm competition that they should be exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny altogether.57 
 
 More recent scholarship associated with the post-Chicago School of antitrust law and economics 
has employed game theoretic models to rebut the Chicago School’s more extreme claims by identifying 
still more circumstances under which vertical practices can harm competition.  It would be a mistake to 
regard these studies as justifying returning to a posture of hostility toward vertical integration and vertical 
contractual restraints.  These analyses generally model the relevant market either as dominant firm 
industries58 or as oligopolistic markets engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition.59  In so doing, these 
models presuppose that the relevant markets are both concentrated and protected by entry barriers.  
Thus, these studies only serve to confirm that vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints 
cannot plausibly harm competition unless the same structural preconditions identified by the Chicago 
School are satisfied.  Furthermore, these models also acknowledge that vertical integration may create 
efficiencies sufficient to offset any anticompetitive effects, which in turn forecloses adopting an position of 
hostility toward vertical integration a priori.60  Although these studies were effective at rebutting calls for 
exempting vertical practices from antitrust scrutiny altogether, these studies’ acknowledgement that 
vertical exclusion is only possible under limited circumstances and is often welfare enhancing belies any 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 20-40, 82-131 (1975); Benjamin Klein, Robert 
G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair 
Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).   
 
56 Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 
373, 453-54 (1966); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and The Economic Approach:  Reflections on 
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 
57 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 226, 231, 288 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the 
Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:  Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 22-25 (1981). 
 
58 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 267, 268 (1983). 
 
59 See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:  MICROECONOMICS 205; Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan, & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers:  A Post-
Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market 
Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988). 
 
60 See, e.g., Hart & Tirole, supra note 59, at 212; Riordan & Salop, supra note 59, at 522-27, 544-51, 
564; Salinger, supra note 59, at 349-50, 354-55. 
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suggestion that they would support returning to the hostility toward vertical integration and vertical 
contractual restraints that prevailed prior to the 1970s. 
 
 Another line of authority, inspired by Michael Whinston’s seminal analysis of tying,61 analyzes the 
possibility that vertical integration could lead to dynamic anticompetitive effects.62  Most of the scenarios 
analyzed by Whinston presuppose the satisfaction of the structural preconditions identified above by 
assuming that the primary market is a monopoly and the secondary market is subject to scale economies.  
Whinston does, however, consider at least one scenario in which the firm engaged in tying faces a degree 
of competition.  Interestingly, although under these circumstances tying can lead to foreclosure, its impact 
on welfare is ultimately ambiguous.  As a result, Whinston explicitly recognized that his model’s 
ambiguous welfare implications, as well as the fact that his model “ignore[s] a number of other possible 
motivations” for tying, undermined its ability to serve as a basis for a practical legal standard.63  Dennis 
Carlton and Michael Waldman’s extension of Whinston’s work similarly emphasizes the ambiguity of the 
welfare implications and cautions against proscribing practices based on the theoretical possibility of harm 
without any evaluation of the potential efficiencies.64  Thus, by their own terms, these models provide no 
support for treating vertical practices as illegal per se.  Instead of embracing per se illegality, these 
models endorse the more case-specific analysis associated with the rule of reason. 
2. The Empirical Literature on Vertical Exclusion 
 The shift in the theoretical literature toward a more accommodating stance toward vertical 
integration and vertical contractual restraints draws further support from the growing empirical literature 
studying those practices.  For example, a recent survey of twenty-three empirical studies of vertical 
integration and vertical contractual restraints conducted by four members of the FTC staff found “a paucity 
of support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical integration are likely to harm consumers.”  
Indeed, only one of the studies under review found that vertical integration was harmful to consumers, 
and even in that study the welfare losses were found to be “miniscule.”  In contrast, “a far greater number 
                                                 
61 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990). 
 
62 See Dennis Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market 
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).  For an argument in favor of network 
neutrality based on these models, see van Schewick, supra note 38, at 353-56.  For a useful analyses of 
the limitations of these models, see James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of 
Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 646-48 (2005); Alexander C. Larson, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After 
Kodak:  A Comment, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 239, 255-57 (1994). 
 
63 Whinston, supra note 61, at 832-34, 855-56. 
 
64 Carlton & Waldman, supra note 61, at 215-16. 
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of studies found that the use of vertical restraints in the particular context studied improved welfare 
unambiguously.”65 
 
 Another recent survey divided the empirical studies of vertical restraints into two categories:  
those that were voluntarily adopted and those that were mandated or prohibited by the government.  This 
survey found that of the twelve published studies of vertical restraints that were voluntarily adopted, nine 
found that the vertical restraint under study enhanced consumer welfare, while only three found that the 
practices reduced consumer welfare.  In contrast, among the eleven studies of vertical restraints that 
were either mandated or prohibited by the government, nine found a reduction in consumer welfare, with 
the welfare impact of the remaining two studies being ambiguous.  Although these authors recognize that 
the small number of studies made it difficult to make definitive claims, they describe the evidentiary 
record “quite striking,” “surprisingly consistent,” and “compelling” in its support for the proposition that 
privately imposed vertical restraints benefit consumers or at least do not harm them.  At the same time, 
“[w]hen the government intervenes and forces firms to adopt (or discontinue the use of) vertical 
restraints, in contrast, it tends to make consumers worse off.”  The survey concluded that the empirical 
record thus provides “consistent and convincing” evidence against government intervention to protect 
against vertical exclusion.66 
3. Supreme Court Doctrine and the Merger Guidelines with Respect to Vertical 
Exclusion 
 Antitrust doctrine with respect to vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints has 
evolved in parallel with the shift in the scholarly consensus.  Prior to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court 
took a rather dim view of vertical integration, in one case striking down a vertical merger between a 
manufacturer and a retailer controlling a mere five percent and one percent of the market respectively.67  
The initial Merger Guidelines issued by the Justice Department in 1968 adopted a similar stance, 
disfavoring mergers between vertically related firms controlling as little as ten and six percent of their 
markets.68  The Court followed a similar pattern with respect to vertical contractual restraints, either 
                                                 
65 Cooper et al., supra note 62, at 648, 660-61. 
 
66 Francine LaFontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:  Empirical Evidence 
and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 21 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., forthcoming 2007), 
available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/slade/wp/ecsept2005.pdf. 
 
67 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1961); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1971) (invalidating vertical merger resulting in 10% foreclosure); United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956) (invalidating vertical merger resulting in 
foreclosure of 6% to 7%).  
 
68 U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 12, 33 Fed. Reg. 23,442 (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade 
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101. 
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holding them illegal per se69 or striking them down at such low levels of concentration as to be tantamount 
to the same thing.70  
 
 Over the last thirty years, antitrust law with respect to vertical integration and vertical 
contractual restraints has evolved to incorporate the insights of the theoretical and empirical literature 
discussed above.  The Supreme Court has determined that per se illegality should be reserved for conduct 
“that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output” and that manifests 
“such a pernicious effect on competition and to be so lack[ing] [in] . . . redeeming value” that nothing 
would be lost declaring it illegal without requiring any demonstration of harm to competition or inquiring 
whether any efficiencies exist that might justify the practice.  Because vertical practices often do not 
impair competition and can in fact enhance economic welfare, the Court concluded that they should 
presumptively be governed by the rule of reason and that any “departure from that standard must be 
justified by demonstrable economic effect.”71   
 
 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court has overruled all of its precedents declaring vertical 
practices illegal per se.  For example, in its landmark Sylvania decision, the Supreme Court overruled a 
decision holding territorial restrictions illegal per se and instead established that all nonprice vertical 
restraints are subject to the rule of reason.72  Regarding vertical restraints with respect to price, in 1997 
the Supreme Court overruled a prior decision holding that vertical agreements setting the maximum price 
that retailers can charge for products were per se illegal and instead held that they were subject to the 
rule of reason.73  Finally, in June 2007, the Supreme Court eliminated the last remaining per se prohibition 
applicable to vertical contractual restraints and held that vertical agreements setting the minimum price 
that retailers could charge for products are governed by the rule of reason.74   
 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (tying); United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1966) (territorial restrictions). 
 
70 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1948) (striking down exclusive dealing 
contract that foreclosed 16% of the market). 
 
71 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724, 726 (1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
72 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1997); see also Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 
724-26. 
 
73 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 
74 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 75 U.S.L.W. 4643 (U.S. June 28, 2007) (No. 06-
480). 
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 Mainstream acceptance of the economic principles discussed above is also reflected in subsequent 
changes to the Justice Department Guidelines applicable to vertical mergers.75  First, the Guidelines 
require that the primary market be concentrated, declaring that antitrust authorities are unlikely to 
challenge a vertical merger unless the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) exceeds 1800, 
which is the level of concentration in a market comprised of between five and six equally sized 
competitors.  It should be noted that these guidelines represent safe harbors within mergers firms are 
immune from challenge.  The mere fact that the post-merger HHI may exceed the defined threshold does 
not necessarily mean that the antitrust enforcement authorities will challenge the merger.  Indeed, a joint 
FTC-Justice Department study of enforcement activity revealed that antitrust authorities almost never 
challenge mergers in the telecommunications industry unless the post-merger HHI exceeds 2400.76  
Second, the Guidelines require that the secondary market be concentrated and protected by entry 
barriers.77  Third, the Guidelines recognize that even if those structural preconditions are met, the 
presence of significant efficiencies might nonetheless justify permitting the merger to go forward even 
though the market structure raises the real possibility of anticompetitive effects.78  In short, the current 
Merger Guidelines requires proof of the same structural prerequisites identified above as a precondition for 
any antitrust enforcement activity.  As such, they concur with the economic consensus and with Supreme 
Court doctrine with respect to vertical restraints by rejecting any categorical prohibitions and instead 
allowing vertical integration to proceed unless harm to competition can be demonstrated on a case-by-
case basis. 
                                                 
75 The current Guidelines covering non-horizontal mergers were originally promulgated as section 4 of the 
overall Merger Guidelines issued by the Justice Department in 1984.  See 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 26,823, 26,834-36 (June 29, 1984).  When issuing the revised Merger Guidelines in 1992, the Justice 
Department and the FTC indicated that section 4 of the 1984 Guidelines continued to provide the 
framework for analyzing vertical mergers.  See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 
41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.  Although the 
1985 Vertical Restraint Guidelines were rescinded by the Clinton Administration, the Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines remain in force, as evidenced by their continuing availability on the Antitrust Division’s 
website.  See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines,  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf.  
 
76 Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dept. of Justice, Merger Challenges Data, Fiscal Years 1999-2003, at tbl. 6 
(2003) (reporting that of 214 merger challenges brought in the telecommunications industry during this 
period, only one involved a market in which the post-merger HHI was below 2400), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/12/mdp.pdf. 
 
77 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 75, § 4.212. 
 
78 Id. §§ 4.212, 4.213, 4.24. 
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4. Antitrust’s Relevance to Network Neutrality 
 As noted earlier, the FCC and antitrust courts have previously raised the concern that network 
owners might use their control over the last mile to harm competition in complementary goods and 
services.79  Policymakers should exercise considerable caution before extending these antitrust and 
regulatory precedents to apply to the modern Internet.  Each of those measures were adopted at a time 
when the local telephone monopoly represented the only means through which providers of 
complementary services could reach end users.  The choice was thus between unregulated monopoly and 
regulation, and the poor economic performance of unregulated monopoly tipped the balance in favor of 
regulation notwithstanding the significant costs. 
 
 The situation is quite different today.  Consistent with the early predictions of the FCC80 and 
contrary to the predictions of early network neutrality advocates,81 DSL has emerged as a viable 
competitor to cable modems, capturing forty-five percent of the market by the end of 2006.82  Verizon is 
the process of investing $23 billion to deploy a new fiber-based broadband service known as FiOS.  In 
addition, a number of alternative last-mile technologies are waiting in the wings, including WiFi, WiMax, 
broadband over powerline, and third-generation mobile communications systems.  
  
 Reframing the policy decision as a choice between regulated and unregulated oligopoly rather 
than a choice between regulated and unregulated monopoly fundamentally alters the relevant policy 
calculus.  Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the oligopolies perform significantly better 
than monopolies.  Given the significant costs of regulation, this improvement in performance may be 
enough to tip the policy balance away from regulation even if the market only consists of three or even 
two competitors.83 
 
                                                 
79 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
 
80 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 20,983 ¶ 186 (2000). 
 
81 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 17, at 161; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 15, at 951-54. 
 
82 Broadband Booms in 2006, THE BRIDGE, Mar. 27, 2007, at 4, available at  
http://www.thebridgemediagroup.com/media/archives/2006Annual_BR032707.pdf. 
 
83 Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition:  Toward a New Model of U.S. 
Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 77-98 (2007). 
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Figure 1 
Network Providers as Intermediaries in a Two-Sided Market 
 
 
 Furthermore, in assessing the competitiveness of the relevant markets, network neutrality 
proponents have often been too facile in defining the relevant geographic markets.84  The fact that most 
consumers confront at best a last-mile duopoly has led many analysts to jump to the conclusion that the 
relevant markets are overly concentrated.85  In so doing, they ignore the fundamental insight that last-
mile providers operate in what amounts to a two-sided market.  In one side of the market, last-mile 
providers bargain with end users.  On the other side of the market, last-mile providers bargain with 
content and applications providers.86   
 
 There is no reason to presume that the geographic scope of both of these markets should be the 
same.  Consider first the downstream market in which last-mile providers contract with end users.  This 
market is clearly local.  As of today, most customers have only two options in last-mile providers:  cable 
modem and DSL service provided by the local cable or telephone company operating in their area.  Given 
the wireline nature of both cable modem and DSL service, last-mile providers located in other cities cannot 
serve as viable substitutes. 
 
 The relevant geographic scope of the other side of the two-sided market, in which last-mile 
providers meet content and applications providers, is quite different.  The content and applications offered 
by different providers can serve as substitutes for one another even if they are located in another part of 
                                                 
84 Yoo, supra note 46, at 254; Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 72; Yoo, supra note 1, 
at 1892-93. 
 
85 See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 15, at 952. 
 
86 This is, of course, something of an oversimplification.  In reality, the industry also encompasses 
backbone providers as well as last-mile providers serving business customers, as well as providers of 
hardware, software, and numerous other complements.  Consistent with the terms of the current debate, 
all upstream providers will be lumped into the category of applications and content providers.  
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International Journal of Communication 1 (2007)  What Can Antitrust Law Contribute 513 
the country.  As a result, the proper scope of the geographic market on this side of the two-sided market 
is national, if not international.   
 
 Absent concentration in the national market, the fact that particular last-mile providers may be 
able to deny content and applications providers to a particular locality is of little consequence.  Although 
the producer of any good or service would like as widespread distribution as possible, firms rarely achieve 
universal distribution.  Yet that fact does not necessarily prevent them from competing effectively.  A 
firm’s inability to obtain distribution in any particular part of the country does not matter so long as it is 
able to obtain sufficient distribution in other parts of the country to assure viability.  In other words, as a 
general matter, content and applications providers care more about the size of the total market they can 
reach than about their ability to reach consumers in any particular metropolitan area.  In fact, the D.C. 
Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the analogous context of cable television.  The court recognized that 
the viability of a cable television network did not depend on its ability to reach audiences in any particular 
locality, but rather on the size of the total audience they are able to reach.  So long as a cable television 
network is able to reach enough viewers to achieve minimum viable scale, its inability to reach any 
particular viewers is beside the point.87  The FCC followed similar reasoning when rejecting arguments that 
the local market power enjoyed by early cellular telephone providers threatened competition in the cellular 
telephone equipment market.  The fact that each cellular provider represented a fraction of the national 
equipment market effectively prevented them from harming competition in the equipment market.88  In 
these markets, it is national reach, not local reach, that matters. 
 
 The geographic scope of the side of the market in which last-mile providers meet content and 
applications providers is thus national.  The relevant question is thus whether the largest players control a 
sufficiently large percentage of the national subscriber base to threaten competition.  A review of the 
subscribership numbers of the leading last-mile broadband providers suggests that, even taking into 
account the recent Adelphia and BellSouth acquisitions, the national market for content and applications 
remains sufficiently unconcentrated to protect against anticompetitive harms.  The overall HHI is 1397, 
below the level of 1800 identified by the Merger Guidelines as the threshold for raising anticompetitive 
concerns and well below the level of 2400 that represents the de facto threshold for enforcement activity 
actually employed by antitrust authorities in the telecommunications industry.  In addition, the market for 
content and applications providers remains vibrantly competitive, and the absence of entry barriers makes 
it likely to remain so. 
 
                                                 
87 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Implementation of 
Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Third Report and 
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19098, 19114-18 ¶¶ 40-50 (1999)). 
 
88 Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 
4028, 4029-30 ¶ 13 (1992). 
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Figure 2 
Last-Mile Broadband Subscribers as of Year End 2006 
Provider 
Subscribers  
(000s) Share HHI 
    
AT&T 12,161 22% 498 
Comcast 11,487 21% 444 
Verizon 6,982 13% 164 
Time Warner 6,644 12% 149 
Cox 4,646 9% 73 
Charter 2,402 4% 19 
Qwest 2,138 4% 15 
Cablevision 2,039 4% 14 
Earthlink 1,886 3% 12 
Embarq 1,017 2% 3 
Verizon FiOS 747 1% 2 
Insight 611 1% 1 
Mediacom 578 1% 1 
Covad 519 1% 1 
CenturyTel 369 1% 0 
CableOne 289 1% 0 
    
Total 54,515 100% 1397 
Source:  Rider Research:  Communications Countdown—Q4 2006, ONLINE REP., Mar. 17, 
2007, at 29. 
 Were network neutrality designed to promote competition on the side of the market in which last-
mile providers meet end users, the market would be local in scope and sufficiently concentrated to provide 
an arguable basis for regulatory intervention.  Network neutrality is not, however, designed to promote 
competition on this side of the market.  Instead, its focus is to protect competition on the side of the 
market in which last-mile providers meet content and applications providers, a market that is national in 
scope and sufficiently deconcentrated as to foreclose any plausible threat to competition.  The foregoing 
discussion underscores the importance of defining the appropriate geographic scope of each side of a two-
sided market separately.  The fact that the relevant geographic scope for one side of the two-sided market 
may be local does not necessarily entail that the relevant geographic scope for other side of the market 
must necessarily be the same.  In particular, on the side of the market in which last-mile providers meet 
applications and content providers, it is relatively unimportant whether content and application providers 
can reach consumers in any particular metropolitan area so long as they can obtain sufficient access to 
other metropolitan areas to ensure that content and applications providers to achieve minimum viable 
scale.   
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 Put a different way, standard oligopoly theory dictates that any market participant’s ability to 
capture rents is dictated by the number of competitive alternatives that are available.  As noted earlier, 
most residential customers have only two options in last-mile broadband providers:  the incumbent cable 
operator and the incumbent local telephone company.  The imposition of network neutrality would not 
increase the number of last-mile options one iota and thus would not change the bargaining power 
between last-mile providers and end users.  Given that network neutrality would, however, leave last-mile 
providers bargaining power vis-à-vis end users unaffected, one would not expect network neutrality to 
lead to any reduction in the prices charged to end users.  Network neutrality would have a dramatic effect 
on the other side of the two-sided market by affecting how last-mile providers and content/applications 
providers divide up those rents.  From this perspective, network neutrality has less to do with benefiting 
consumers and more to do with adjusting the bargaining power between the Verizons and the Googles of 
the world. 
 
 Not only are the structural preconditions necessary for vertical integration to harm competition 
not satisfied; as I have argued at some length in my prior work, deviations from network neutrality can 
also yield substantial efficiencies.  For example, giving priority to packets associated with time-sensitive 
applications can broaden the number of ways in which network owners can manage the growing problem 
of network congestion.89  In addition, experimenting with different protocols and establishing exclusivity 
arrangements with certain content providers can sharpen competition among last-mile providers by 
allowing them to diversify their offerings.90  Allowing combinations of content and conduit can also 
eliminate double marginalization and yield substantial transaction cost efficiencies,91 as the FCC 
recognized when approving SBC-AT&T, Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers.92  Indeed, all of the 
academic commentators at the FTC’s Public Workshop on Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy, 
regardless of whether they were generally favorably or unfavorably disposed toward network neutrality, 
uniformly recognized that deviations from network neutrality can be beneficial as well as harmful. 
 
 Antitrust law has long settled how to address practices that have an ambiguous impact on 
welfare.  If a practice is always harmful (or so nearly always harmful that little would be lost declaring it 
unlawful without any close examination of its precise effect on competition), the practice is declared illegal 
per se.93  If a practice is never harmful, a case can be made in favor of treating it as legal per se.94  When 
                                                 
89 Yoo, supra note 1, at 1863-85. 
 
90 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 27-37. 
 
91 Yoo, supra note 46, at 192-200, 260-65. 
 
92 AT&T-BellSouth Order, supra note 5, at 5768-69 ¶¶ 211-213; Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 5, at 
18533-34 ¶¶ 202-203; SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 5, at 18387-88 ¶¶ 190-191. 
 
93 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
 
94 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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a practice can plausibly be either harmful or beneficial, as seems to be the case with most vertical 
practices (including deviations from network neutrality), antitrust law applies the rule of reason, which 
permits the practice to go forward unless and until those challenging the practice can demonstrate actual 
anticompetitive harm.95 
 
 From this perspective, mandating network neutrality would be the functional equivalent of 
declaring certain vertical practices illegal per se.  Such an outcome has no support in economic theory 
(which finds the welfare implications of vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints to be 
ambiguous) or in empirical studies of vertical exclusion (which suggest that vertical integration and 
vertical contractual restraints tend to be welfare enhancing more often than not).  Mandating network 
neutrality would also be contradicted by the regulatory precedents of the FCC, which have consistently 
found insufficient evidence indicating that discrimination against content and applications providers poses 
any threat to competition.96   
 
 Taking such a position is in no way inconsistent with acknowledging that standardization can yield 
substantial benefits.  Indeed, as the literature on network economic effects demonstrates, powerful 
incentives in favor of standardization already exist.  Indeed, if these incentives are sufficiently strong, 
there would be no need to mandate standardization as a regulatory matter.  If anything, network 
economic effects raise the possibility that the incentives toward standardization may be too strong and 
that deviations from the existing standard should be encouraged rather than discouraged.97  The proper 
question in determining whether to ban deviations from network neutrality is not whether network 
neutrality is in general beneficial, as it doubtlessly is in many, if not most, cases.  Instead, the proper 
question is whether deviations from network neutrality pose such a great threat to competition that firms 
should not be permitted to experiment with them.  The existence of plausible justifications for deviating 
from network neutrality undercuts the case for prohibiting such deviations a priori.  On the contrary, the 
empirical studies indicating that vertical integration tends to promote economic welfare suggests that it 
would be more appropriate to adopt a permissive stance toward vertical integration and to place the 
burden of proof should rest on those who would oppose it.98 
 
 Permitting experimentation with practices until concrete harm can be demonstrated also appears 
to be an appropriate way to show humility about anyone’s ability to predict which approaches will 
ultimately prove to be best for consumers.  This lesson is demonstrated quite vividly by the furor 
surrounding America Online’s acquisition of Time Warner.  Many observers warned that the resulting 
                                                 
95 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). 
 
96 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Yoo, supra note 1, at 1908 & n.33 (collecting 
statements from Michael Powell, Kevin Martin, and Jonathan Adelstein acknowledging the absence of any 
evidence that network owners were discriminating against particular content or applications). 
 
97 See supra notes 16, 29 and accompanying text. 
 
98 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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combination of content and conduit would turn AOL into a “walled garden” in which end users could only 
reach proprietary content.99  This business strategy turned out to be a colossal failure, and AOL soon 
abandoned that approach.  My point is not to employ 20-20 hindsight to show that these concerns were 
misplaced.  Indeed, modern economics recognizes that competition among large, vertically integrated 
enterprises represents nothing more than an alternative way to organize an industry that can be quite 
efficient, so long as interbrand competition is sufficiently robust.  It is thus quite possible to imagine 
circumstances in which AOL’s business strategy might well have proved successful.   
 
 Instead, the AOL-Time Warner merger serves as a cautionary note, underscoring just how hard it 
is to anticipate the likely success and the likely welfare implications of any particular business strategy ex 
ante and how robust markets can be in preventing the kinds of harms that network neutrality proponents 
envision.  Given these difficulties, the better approach would be to give every industry participant the 
latitude to experiment with different business models until concrete competitive harm can be shown.  
Such experimentation may uncover a different approach that may prove more efficient.  Conversely, 
adopting too stringent a stance toward experimentation threatens either to allow the government’s 
assessment of an innovation’s likely success to determine whether it is permitted to go forward or to 
forestall the market from ever finding out which innovations would be welfare enhancing.   
5. Separating the Horizontal from the Vertical 
 The most recent iteration of the network neutrality debate has taken an additional twist.  Rather 
than focusing on network owners’ ability to discriminate vertically against content and applications 
providers, this new version of network neutrality would limit network owners’ ability to discriminate 
horizontally against other, similarly situated networks.100 
 
 This development underscores the extent to which network neutrality has represented something 
of a moving target.  In its initial iteration, the debate focused on structural remedies that would have 
required physical unbundling of cable modem systems.101  The next generation of network neutrality 
scholarship abandoned physical unbundling as unworkable.102  Instead, network neutrality proponents 
embraced a system of nondiscrimination, regardless of whether that was directed at the client side (i.e., 
consumers) or the server side (i.e., content and applications providers), in an attempt to ensure that 
access to the benefits of the faster Internet did not depend on the ability to pay.  In 2006, network 
neutrality proponents staged another tactical retreat, conceding the validity of consumer-side tiering and 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Cristian DeFrancia, Ownership Controls in the New Entertainment Economy:  A Search for 
Direction, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 120-123 (2002), http://www.vjolt.net/archives.php?issue=11. 
 
100 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law?  Anti-Discrimination Norms in 
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 36-37 (2006). 
 
101 See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 15. 
 
102 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 12, at 147-49. 
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limiting their opposition to server-side tiering (sometimes called “access tiering”).103  Most recently, 
network neutrality proponents have conceded the validity of access tiering and have simply argued for 
nondiscrimination within tiers.   
 
 The potential threat to competition associated with the most recent iteration of the debate is 
strikingly different in nature than those raised previously.  Up until now, network neutrality has focused 
almost exclusively on ensuring access to providers of complementary services serving the same customers 
as the network to which access was sought, a type of access Daniel Spulber and I have called platform 
access.  Because this form of access focuses on complementary services, it is basically vertical in nature.  
The new approach to network neutrality would mandate access to networks providing the same services to 
different customers, a type of access we term interconnection access.104  Because these are firms who are 
competing to sell similar services to the same customers, this type of access is horizontal in nature. 
 
 There can be no question that the horizontal aspects make interconnection access potentially 
more justifiable than platform access.105  In fact, a number of noted scholars have suggested that 
interconnection access should be mandated.106  That said, it must be remembered that network economic 
effects already provide powerful incentives for networks to interconnect with one another.107  In a market 
consisting of five equally sized players, for example, a network that refused to interconnect with the 
others would operate at a significant competitive disadvantage.108  When that is the case, the market 
should prove quite able to guarantee interconnection even in the absence of a regulatory mandate.  The 
formal models demonstrating how refusal to interconnect can harm competition have generally been 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., Net Neutrality:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
109th Cong. 55 (2006) (statement of Lawrence Lessig), available at  
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.pdf. 
 
104 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Network Regulation:  The Many Faces of Access, 1 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 635, 641-43 (2005). 
 
105 Besen & Farrell, supra note 13, at 117. 
 
106 Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the Telecommunications Act of 
1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 973-74 (1997); Shelanski, supra note 83, at 99-100; James B. Speta, A 
Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 268-79 (2002); Kevin 
Werbach, Only Connect (Feb. 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=964991. 
 
107 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 105 (noting that “[i]n markets with network effects, there is natural 
tendency toward de facto standardization”). 
 
108 Faulhaber, supra note 44, at 501-02; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 429. 
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based on an effective duopoly in which a dominant player competes with smaller rivals.109  Absent such 
market concentration, a firm cannot plausibly use its interconnection policies to harm competition.110  And 
even duopoly markets can promote competition by sparking a race for the market.111 
 
 Consistent with this reasoning, the FCC has declined to mandate interconnection among wireless 
telephone providers because, given the absence of a dominant player, competition already provided 
sufficiently powerful incentives to interconnect.112  The FCC followed the same approach with respect to 
backbone interconnection, reasoning that “[s]o long as there is ‘rough equality’ among backbone 
providers, each has an incentive to peer with the others to provide universal connectivity to the 
Internet.”113  Given the fairly low level of concentration in the market for last-mile services described in 
Figure 2, the same logic would seem to apply to the interconnection of last-mile broadband networks.   
 
 Economic theory has identified one way in which even last-mile providers without market power 
in the national market can nonetheless use their terminating access monopoly to harm competition.114  
This market failure results from what is in essence a common pool problem stemming from the fact that 
the U.S. follows the practice that the calling party pays the long distance carrier for the entirety of the 
                                                 
109 Besen & Farrell, supra note 13, at 119-29; Jacques Crémer, Patrick Rey, & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in 
the Commercial Internet, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 433 (2000); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology 
Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986). 
 
110 Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake:  Connecting Internet Backbones 31-32 (FCC Office of Plans & 
Pol’y Working Paper No. 32, Sept. 2000), available at  
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf. 
 
111 Besen & Farrell, supra note 13, at 122; Glenn A. Woroch, Open Access Rules and the Broadband Race, 
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 719. 
 
112 Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Fourth Report 
and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000).  
 
113 Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 5, at 18496 ¶ 118; SBC-AT&T Order, supra note 5, at 18354 ¶ 117; 
accord AT&T-BellSouth Order, supra note 5, at 5732 ¶ 131, 5735-37 ¶¶ 140-144.  The FCC reiterated, 
“[I]n a market where each backbone provider derives roughly equal benefit from settlement-free access to 
the other backbone providers’ customers, the incentive to cooperate will predominate and the market 
participants will peer with each other.”  Verizon-MCI Order, supra note 5, at 18496 ¶ 118; SBC-AT&T 
Order, supra note 5, at 18354 ¶ 117. 
 
114 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 182-86 (2000); ROBERT CRANDALL 
& LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP:  THE PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 265-66 (1995).  The terminating access monopoly problem is succinctly summarized 
in Access Charge Reform, Fifth Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 
14221, 14313-14 ¶ 181 (1999). 
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long distance call.  Long distance carriers are, of course, not the only carriers that incur costs when a 
customer places a long distance call.  The local telephone carrier (termed by the governing statute the 
local exchange carrier or “LEC”) for the party originating the call must incur costs to provide a connection 
between the customer’s premises and the long distance carrier’s point of presence in the originating LEC’s 
central office.  Furthermore, the terminating LEC must also incur the cost of connecting the call from its 
central office to the customer premises of the party to whom the call is placed.  Long distance carriers 
compensate originating and terminating LECs through a series of federally mandated access charges, 
which under current law must be uniform across all carriers and all customers.  In other words, the cost of 
terminating access is covered by requiring customers to make uniform contributions to a common pool. 
 
 The key question is what impact the deregulation of access charges would have on originating 
and terminating LECs’ pricing behavior.  The FCC has concluded that the possibility that the originating 
carrier might charge excessive access charges is effectively limited by the fact that the calling party 
chooses its local service provider, decides whether to place the call, and ultimately bears the cost of the 
call.  The calling party, either directly or indirectly through its long distance carrier, is thus well situated to 
exert price discipline over originating access charges.  The same is not true, however, for terminating 
access charges.  Because neither the calling party nor its long distance carrier has any influence over the 
called party’s choice of LEC, neither can exert any price discipline over terminating access charges.  
Furthermore, the common pool aspect of the access charge regime means that a LEC’s customers will not 
bear the full brunt of any increase in terminating access charges.  Instead, the impact of the higher prices 
will be spread over the entire universe of local telephone subscribers.  This, in turn, gives terminating 
LECs both the ability and the incentive to raise terminating access charges above competitive levels in 
order to draw a disproportionate amount of compensation out of the common pool.  The impetus to 
increase terminating access charges exists regardless of whether competition in local access exists or the 
terminating LEC is small.  Indeed, small carriers may well have the greatest incentive to increase 
terminating access charges, because the percentage of the increase that their own customers will be 
disproportionately small.  At the same time, such pricing behavior might give long distance carriers 
greater incentive to enter the local access market in order to avoid paying these charges.115   
 
 A number of mechanisms exist to solve this problem without mandating interconnection.  For 
example, the incentive to increase terminating access charges would disappear if the FCC were to 
mandate the intercarrier compensation regime known as central office bill and keep.116  Indeed, any 
uniform access pricing regime would eliminate the ability for terminating LECs to take advantage of the 
common pool problem, although economic efficiency would ultimately depend on ensuring that access 
prices are set at competitive levels.  In addition, LECs’ incentive to increase terminating access charges 
could also be eliminated by mandating that terminating access charges be reciprocal, although reciprocity 
                                                 
115 Id. 
 
116 Patrick DeGraba, Bill and Keep at the Central Office as the Efficient Interconnection Regime 26 ¶ 90 
(FCC Off. of Plans & Pol’y Working Paper 33, Dec. 2000), available at  
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp33.pdf. 
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may have implications for entry.117  Reciprocity is not as effective when LECs do not originate and 
terminate traffic in a roughly symmetrical manner, as illustrated by disputes over carriers that only serve 
customers that receive calls, such as Internet service providers,118 conference call companies, and chat 
rooms.119  Finally, the terminating access charges used by the incumbent LEC with which the new entrant 
competes can be used as a benchmark for determining the reasonableness of the new entrant’s 
terminating access charges.120  A complete resolution of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper.  For 
our purposes, determining which of these different mechanisms would best promote consumer welfare is 
less important than the fact that institutional mechanisms may exist for solving the terminating access 
problem that do not require imposing an access mandate. 
                                                 
117 Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrick Rey, & Jean Tirole, Network Competition:  I. Overview and 
Nondiscriminatory Pricing, 29 RAND J. ECON. 1, 8-12 (1998); Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrick Rey, & Jean 
Tirole, Competition Between Telecommunications Operators, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 701 (1997). 
 
118 The extended dispute over the proper classification of ISP-bound traffic underscores the problems with 
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119 This problem is well illustrated by the ongoing dispute over “traffic pumping.”  A small group of rural 
Iowa LECs left the uniform tariffs established by the National Exchange Carrier Association and negotiated 
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F.C.C.R. 9923, 9941-50 ¶¶ 45-63 (2001); Noel D. Uri, Monopoly Power and the Problem of CLEC Access 
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B. Vertical Exclusion and Dynamic Efficiency 
 The antitrust commentary has also long emphasized how forcing owners of bottleneck facilities to 
share those inputs with competitors can harm dynamic efficiency.121  Mandated sharing can dampen 
investment incentives in two ways.  First, it can dampen incumbents’ incentives to invest in their own 
networks.  As an initial matter, the fact that any benefits would have to be shared takes away much of the 
incentive to invest in network improvements.  Furthermore, network owners can render mandated sharing 
a nullity simply by charging exorbitant prices.  It is thus widely recognized that any form of mandated 
sharing must be accompanied by some form of price regulation.122  If such regulation is to have any 
impact, it must necessarily limit supracompetitive returns and force prices toward competitive levels.  In 
so doing, it removes much of the incumbent’s incentive to undertake such investments.  As the Supreme 
Court recognized in Trinko: 
 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.  
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
“business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth.123 
Indeed, the Court noted that “establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve 
their customers” represents one of the legitimate ways in which a telecommunications provider can 
compete.124 
 
 Second, mandated access deters competitors from investing in alternative network capacity.  As 
an initial matter, by eliminating the price umbrella that would otherwise exist, price regulation makes it 
harder for others to enter.  Indeed, the presence of supracompetitive returns is what signals market 
participants that the market is in disequilibrium and is what provides the incentives for restoring long-run 
equilibrium by causing an outward shift in the supply curve.  Furthermore, in the words of the Ninth 
Circuit in Alaska Airlines, “[e]very time the monopolist asserts its market dominance” by denying rivals 
access to a bottleneck input gives the rival “more incentive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn 
gives alternative suppliers more reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist.  Every act 
                                                 
121 The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis in Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. 
Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet:  The Hidden Side of Trinko, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2007). 
 
122 Indeed, as I have argued at length earlier, price regulation is only one of four regulatory requirements 
implicit in any regime of mandated access.  The others are interconnection, standardization, and 
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123 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
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exploiting monopoly power to the disadvantage of the monopoly’s customers hastens the monopoly’s end 
by making the potential competition more attractive.”125  Mandating that the incumbent share its network 
with its competitors rescues them from having to undertake such investments and deprives would-be 
builders of alternative network capacity of their natural strategic partners.126  Indeed, by dampening 
incentives to invest in alternative network capacity, mandating access can have the perverse effect of 
entrenching a bottleneck facility into place.  In addition, because the monopoly is shared instead of being 
displaced, mandating access presumes that such regulatory intervention will be indefinite.  At best, the 
inevitable delay in governmental processes to adjust to changing business realities means that there will 
be some lag in the remedy.  At worst, the regulatory regime will forestall competition from ever emerging. 
 
 The Supreme Court echoed these concerns in Trinko, in which it noted, “Compelling such firms to 
share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since 
it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial 
facilities.”127  Compelled sharing should be approached with considerable caution because it would “‘chill 
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”128  Trinko’s language represents one of the 
most ringing endorsements offered by the Court to date about the importance of dynamic efficiency as 
well as a candid recognition of how mandating access can impair it.   
 
 Trinko’s insights have been confirmed by the empirical literature studying how access 
requirements have adversely affected the buildout of broadband networks.  These studies have uniformly 
failed to find support for the claim that unbundling has promoted the deployment of broadband 
networks.129  The adverse impact that compelled access can have on investment incentives is also 
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demonstrated quite eloquently by the jump in investment in alternative broadband platforms in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X.130  Once the Supreme Court made clear that 
regulation would no longer guarantee access to the network that exists today, content and applications 
providers began pouring money into broadband over powerline and wireless broadband technologies, 
demonstrated most dramatically by Google’s offer to provide San Francisco with a wireless broadband 
network for free.131  Once such entry occurs, even network neutrality proponents generally concede there 
will be no need for antitrust or regulatory authorities to mandate access to the network. 
 
 This only serves to underscore one of the insights of vertical integration theory, which is that a 
vertical chain of production will achieve efficiency if each link of the chain is competitive.  This insight 
suggests that the central concern of Internet policy should be identifying and deconcentrating the level of 
production that is the most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers.  In the case of the 
Internet, that level of production is clearly the last mile.  Network neutrality proponents somewhat 
curiously focus their attention on preserving and promoting competition in applications and content, which 
is the level of competition that is already the most competitive and, because of the lack of entry barriers, 
the most likely to remain that way.  In short, network neutrality focuses on the wrong policy problem.  
The decision whether to mandate network neutrality should turn not on its impact on markets for 
applications and content, but rather on its impact on competition in the last mile.  The irony is that, as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
statistically significantly related to broadband diffusion under multivariate analysis), available at 
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/berling04/Papers/cava-ferreruela_alabau-munoz.pdf; 
Martha Garcia-Murillo & David Gabel, International Broadband Deployment:  The Impact of Unbundling 
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http://tprc.org/papers/2003/234/IntrntBrdbndDeploy.pdf; Thomas Hazlett & Coleman Bazelon, Regulated 
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks:  A Stepping Stone to Facilities-Based Competition? 16-19 
(Oct. 4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 33rd Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference) (analyzing subscribership data to conclude that unbundling does not drive broadband 
competition), available at  
http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/pubs/Stepping%20Stone%20TPRC.10.04.05 %20.pdf.   
 These conclusions are consistent with growing body of empirical evidence that unbundling did not 
promote competition in conventional telephony.  See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory 
Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose?  Empirical Evidence form Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 
(2005); Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 
B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2004), http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/; Augustin J. Ros & Karl 
McDermott, Are Residential Local Exchange Prices Too Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED 
INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. Crew ed., 2000); James Zolnierek et al., An Empirical Examination of Entry 
Patterns in Local Telephone Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 (2001). 
 
130 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 
131 Yoo, supra note 1, at 1894-95.  
International Journal of Communication 1 (2007)  What Can Antitrust Law Contribute 525 
Supreme Court recognized in Trinko, the reduction in investment incentives associated with compelled 
sharing of telecommunications networks of the type envisioned by network neutrality proponents arguably 
threatens to make things worse.   
III. Institutional Considerations 
 The foregoing discussion demonstrates the extent to which a clear understanding of antitrust 
law’s stance toward vertical integration can provide insights into the network neutrality debate.  
Acknowledging the relevance of the antitrust law’s substantive principles does not resolve whether 
antitrust courts are the proper locus for enforcement.  Indeed, antitrust scholars have long questioned 
antitrust courts’ institutional competence to supervise the type of access mandate that network neutrality 
would entail.132   
 
 As noted earlier, a network owner can render any access mandate a nullity simply by charging an 
exorbitant price.  Access mandates thus necessarily presuppose some type of rate regulation.133  The law 
has long recognized that antitrust courts are ill suited to assessing the reasonableness of any particular 
price.  For example, in Trenton Potteries, the Supreme Court warned against “placing on the government 
in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether [price] has become 
unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions.”  The Court elaborated: 
 
[I]n the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a 
construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of 
business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable—a 
determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our 
economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies. 
Any such assessment would need constant updating, as “the reasonable price fixed today may through 
economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.”134 Subsequent judicial 
decisions have repeatedly emphasized the difficulties that antitrust courts face in determining the 
reasonableness of any particular price.135 
                                                 
132 The discussion that follows draws on the more complete analysis in Spulber & Yoo, supra note 121. 
 
133 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 
134 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927). 
 
135 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 
U.S. 265, 281-82 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14 (1940); Cline v. 
Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 462-63 (1927); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 
597 (7th Cir. 1996); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.).  
See generally 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 720b, at 256-58 (reviewing these arguments and 
collecting cases). 
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 Commentators criticizing the essential facilities doctrine have similarly noted antitrust courts’ lack 
of institutional competence to implement access mandates.  In the words of Philip Areeda’s now-classic 
analysis of the essential facilities doctrine, “[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain 
or adequately and reasonably supervise.  The problem should be deemed irremedial by antitrust law when 
compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory 
agency.”136   
 
 Areeda extended this argument in his treatise.  Because access mandates necessarily force 
network owners to enter into business relationships against their wishes, those relationships are likely to 
be constantly embroiled in disputes over the reasonableness of the prices charged.  As a result, mandating 
access requires “price regulation of the kind undertaken by regulatory agencies—something for which both 
the federal courts and the antitrust litigation process are extremely ill-suited and which is, in any event, 
inconsistent with antitrust’s fundamental ‘market’ orientation to problems of lack of competition.”  The 
disputes, moreover, are likely to extend to nonprice terms and conditions as well.  Should the demand 
outstrip the existing capacity, access forces network owners not merely to sell out of its excess capacity, 
but to reduce its own output or expand its plant in order to service a rival.137  The effect is to force 
antitrust courts into ongoing supervision of almost all aspects of the business relationship between the 
parties, as demonstrated by the number of times that the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve 
disputes about the implementation of the decree in Terminal Railroad.138   
 
 It is for this reason that commentators have questioned causes of action that require antitrust 
courts to engage in ongoing supervision of regulatory decrees.  In the words of Richard Posner and Frank 
Easterbrook: 
 
There is a sense in which the entry of a regulatory decree signifies that the case should 
never have been brought.  The decree is an acknowledgement that competition will not 
work in the particular circumstances of the case. . . . The question is thus posed whether 
antitrust enforcement, the cardinal purpose of which is to prevent and destroy 
                                                 
136 Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities:  An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 
(1989).  Areeda acknowledged compelling access where the monopolist is a consortium that can admit 
additional members or where a regulatory agency already exists to control the terms of dealing. 
 
137 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, ¶ 765c, at 101-02, ¶ 771b, at 172, ¶ 772d, at 194, ¶ 773a, at 
198, ¶ 774e, at 223, 227-28; ¶ 787c1, at 302-10; see also Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential 
Facilities, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1243, 1283-84; Werden, supra note 45, at 460-61.   
 
138 Ex parte United States, 226 U.S. 420 (1913); Terminal R.R. Ass’n v. United States, 236 U.S. 194 
(1915); Terminal R.R. Ass’n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924).  See generally Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1196-98 (1999). 
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monopolies, is also a suitable tool for domesticating those monopolies that are 
ineradicable at acceptable cost.139 
Any suggestion that these criticisms have been limited to commentators associated with the Chicago 
School is belied by the fact that two distinguished regulatory economists not noted for deregulatory views 
(including one who played a leading role in the imposition of the equal access mandate during the breakup 
of AT&T) have suggested that access regimes have proven so unworkable that they should be 
abandoned.140  
 
 The Supreme Court endorsed these same criticisms in Trinko, in which the Court noted, “Enforced 
sharing . . . requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and 
other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.”  Furthermore, mandating access “‘can be 
difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.’”  In 
particular, disputes over access to telecommunications networks “are difficult for antitrust courts to 
evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely 
numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and 
incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations.”  Because “[e]ffective 
remediation of violations of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require continuing supervision 
of a highly detailed decree,” implementing access requirements “may be . . . ‘beyond the practical ability 
of a judicial tribunal to control.’”  In short, “[a]n antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day 
enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations.”  Thus, the Court endorsed Areeda’s conclusion that 
antitrust law should not be construed to require courts “‘to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic 
of a regulatory agency.’”141   
 
 This sweeping language, if read broadly, would foreclose any role for antitrust courts in 
supervising access mandates, including network neutrality.  Like any access requirement, implementing 
network neutrality would require antitrust courts to undertake a variety of tasks, including standardizing 
the interface across which the access will occur, adjudicating the inevitable disputes over interconnection, 
enforcing nondiscrimination, and regulating both the price and the nonprice terms of interconnection.  As 
                                                 
139 Richard A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST:  CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 762-
63 (2d ed. 1981). 
 
140 Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:  Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and 
Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252-53 (1999). 
 
141 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408, 414-15 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (en banc); and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); 
and citing Areeda, supra note 136, at 853).   
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such, network neutrality would require antitrust courts to oversee almost all major aspects of the business 
relationship between network owners and content and applications providers.142 
 
 Other scholars have offered more limited readings of Trinko, suggesting that the case be read as 
incorporating something akin to the active supervision requirement developed with respect to state action 
immunity.143  Other scholars have suggested that the degree of agency involvement need not rise to that 
level before judicial involvement would be foreclosed.  Instead, it is sufficient if the issue is “under 
ongoing study” or if the agency has “manifested its ability and will to evaluate the conduct if asked.”144 
 
 It is too early to determine which of these various readings of Trinko will ultimately prevail and 
whether the level of oversight undertaken by the FCC is sufficient to forestall antitrust enforcement.  The 
FCC first began to address network neutrality in March 2002, when the FCC sought comment on whether 
it should impose access requirements on cable modem systems.145  In response, several industry consortia 
of content/application providers and device manufacturers submitted comments asking the FCC to 
mandate certain “connectivity principles” that represented the first network neutrality proposals.146  Two 
months after the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision resolved the judicial challenge to this action in the 
FCC’s favor,147 the FCC ruled that the evidence was insufficient to justify mandating network neutrality at 
that time.  At the same time, the FCC issued a policy statement announcing its general support for 
consumers’ right to access content, run applications, and attach devices as they see fit and indicating 
those principles would guide its future policymaking activities.  The FCC also indicated that it would not 
                                                 
142 Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, supra note 18, at 39-45; Yoo, supra note 1, at 1896-97.  Indeed, two 
noted scholars who generally take strikingly different approaches have both concluded that network 
neutrality would require regulation that would be just as intrusive as conventional common carriage 
regulation.  See Christian Sandvig, Network Neutrality Is the New Common Carriage, 9 INFO 136 (2007); 
Bruce M. Owen, The Net Neutrality Debate:  Twenty Five Years After United States v. AT&T and 120 Years 
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03, Feb. 2007), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1363. 
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4843-48 ¶¶ 83-95 (2002). 
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147 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996 (2005). 
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hesitate to take action against such contact should such evidence emerge.148  Indeed, just five months 
earlier, it had acted swiftly when a small, rural telecommunications carrier known as Madison River 
Communications blocked the ports that its DSL customers needed to access VoIP services.149  The FCC’s 
decisions clearing Verizon’s acquisition of MCI, SBC’s acquisition of AT&T, the spinoff of Adelphia’s cable 
properties to Comcast and Time Warner, and AT&T’s acquisition of BellSouth reiterated the conclusion that 
the evidence was insufficient to justify mandating network neutrality.150  The FCC nonetheless accepted 
voluntary commitments by the merging parties regarding network neutrality as being in the public 
interest.151  Finally, the FCC recently issued a Notice of Inquiry to explore the business practices of 
broadband providers and seeking comment on whether to mandate network neutrality.152 
 
 It is thus not yet clear what role, if any, antitrust courts can play in mandating network 
neutrality.  The questions surrounding Trinko in no way prevent agencies like the FTC from exercising its 
authority to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices to enhance consumers’ access to information.  A 
good model is the FTC’s role in promoting more widespread use of privacy policies.153  Such action would 
shift attention away from nondiscrimination with respect to content, applications, and devices, which were 
first three of the four “Internet Freedoms” articulated by then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell in 2004, and 
toward Powell’s all-too-often ignored fourth freedom:  consumers’ right to clear and meaningful 
information regarding their service plans.154  Ensuring that consumers have complete information about 
the precise nature (including the limits) of their Internet service plan would be completely consistent with 
Trinko and would be a role to which agencies such as the FTC are well suited. 
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Conclusion  
 Antitrust does have constructive role to play in the network neutrality debate.  Antitrust 
authorities and courts have developed a body of substantive law based on sound and widely accepted 
principles of competition policy that is often overlooked by the Internet community.  Furthermore, the 
commentary and doctrine on vertical exclusion sound useful cautionary notes about the dangers of 
adopting a reflexive hostility toward vertical integration.  Instead, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
the rule of reason over per se illegality provides powerful support for adopting a case-by-case approach 
that permits network owners to experiment with various practices until actual harm to competition can be 
shown. 
 
Although the substance of antitrust law can offer insights that can help guide the network 
neutrality debate, whether the institutional apparatus of antitrust has a similarly constructive role to play 
depends on how broadly subsequent courts read Trinko’s sweeping indictment of antitrust courts’ 
competency to supervise access mandates.  The eventual resolution of this ambiguity will not affect the 
authority of agencies like the FTC to exercise their consumer protection mandate to ensure that 
consumers have complete information about the precise nature of their service plans. 
 
